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Oceans cover 70% of the world’s surface and are a source of 90% of the world’s 
biomass. Oceans provide the world’s populations with food and facilitate 
international trade in goods. The shipping industry is a notable source (although 
not leading source) of marine pollution both from operational discharges and 
maritime incidents. With a vast number of ships navigating the world’s oceans 
the impact of maritime incidents, especially of bulk carriers of oil, on the marine 
environment can be devastating.  
Ships which become distressed often attempt to find a ‘place of refuge’, being a 
nearby port or a sheltered area within the territorial waters of a nearby coastal 
state. Traditionally these ships in distress had the customary law right of entry 
into port in order to ensure that persons on board could be saved. This position 
seems to have changed in the modern age. With the advancement of modern 
technology persons on board can be saved without bringing the distressed ship 
into port. In addition, these ships in distress present a serious risk to the marine 
environment within the waters of the coastal state. Coastal state practice seems 
to indicate that coastal states prioritise the preservation of their own sovereign 
waters over the needs of the particular ship in distress, especially where there is 
no risk to human life. It would seem that the traditional customary law rights of 
ships in distress do not apply to circumstances where there is no risk to the 
persons on board and where there is only a risk to the marine environment. 
These ships are now commonly called ships in need of assistance and are 
differentiated from ships in distress due to the fact that the risk is one to the 
marine environment and not to human life. 
The result of the refusing places of refuge creates the problem of ships in need 
of assistance as such ships proceed to beg for entry from other nearby coastal 
states usually being refused along the way. Through the discussion of notable 
maritime incidents of this nature it will be shown that such refusal of entry by 
coastal states into a place of refuge is a leading factor that increases the 
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probability of a maritime incident occurring and thereby increasing the likelihood 
of damage to the marine environment. 
The concept of state sovereignty has been utilised as a justification for coastal 
states refusing entry into a place of refuge.  This dissertation will discuss the 
concept of coastal state sovereignty paying particular attention to the legislative 
and enforcement rights of coastal states in the regulation of pollution and the 
protection of the marine environment. The international community has long 
since recognised that the protection of the marine environment is a general state 
duty and a principle of international customary law. The duty to protect and 
preserve the marine environment guides, informs and restricts coastal state 
action. This dissertation analyses the relationship between sovereignty and the 
duty to protect the marine environment in the context of ships in need of 
assistance in modern international law.  
This dissertation seeks to conclude with an overall analysis of the current 
customary and modern international law rights of ships in need of assistance in 
order to determine whether coastal states are obliged to grant places of refuge. 
The IMO Guidelines will be discussed to analyse whether same add any value 
to the problem of ships in need of assistance and to what end such guidelines 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Where a ship is in a situation of distress and poses a risk to the marine 
environment, say, through the discharge of oil, it is stated that the best way of 
preventing such environmental pollution is for that ship to navigate, if possible, 
into a sheltered area.1 These sheltered areas are usually within the territorial 
waters of a particular coastal state or that coastal state’s port. These sheltered 
areas have come to be known as places of refuge. The purpose of a place of 
refuge is to allow the ship an opportunity to take necessary actions to stabilise 
its condition and conduct repairs. It has been recognised that “the longer a 
damaged ship is forced to remain at the mercy of the elements in the open sea, 
the greater the risk of the vessel’s condition deteriorating or the sea, weather or 
environmental situation changing and thereby becoming a greater potential 
hazard”.2 Affording a ship a place of refuge reduces the hazards to navigation 
and the likelihood of environmental pollution.3 
Carriage of goods by sea, particularly bulk carriage of oil and related petroleum 
substances, is a risky business. Notwithstanding the advances in navigation and 
satellite technology many casualties still occur at sea. Shipping accidents cannot 
be eliminated.4 Shipping accidents may result in the loss of human life and 
participation in the shipping industry is regarded as a dangerous profession. 
This is evident in the fatality rate of seafarers which is twelve times higher than 
in the general workforce.5 
Even though  shipping losses have decreased significantly from 1 ship per 100 
per year in 1912 to 1 ship per 670 per year in 2009, catastrophic accidents such 
                                                          
1
 Timagenis G “Place of refuge as a legislative problem” 2003 CMI Yearbook 376. 
2
 IMO Assembly, 23
rd
 session, Resolution A949 (23) Guidelines on Places of Refuge foe ships in Need of 
Assistance adopted on 5 December 2003, Annex, Article 1.19 (IMO Guidelines). 
3
 IMO Guidelines Article 1.19. 
4
 Ceyhun G “The Impact of Shipping Accidents on Marine Environment: A Study of Turkish Seas” 2014 
(10) European Scientific Journal 1; Akten N “Shipping accidents: a serious threat for marine environment” 
2006 (12) Journal of the Black Sea Mediterranean Environment 269.   
5 Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG & Cardiff University “Safety and Shipping 1912-2012 From the 
Titanic to the Costa Concordia” (2012) unpublished paper by Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG 2. 
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as the sinking of the Prestige tanker near the coast of Galicia (Spain) illustrate 
the dire consequences such accidents can have on the marine environment. 6  
The effects of oil spills may result in the loss of key organisms from an 
environmental community, increases in chemical toxicity giving rise to lethal 
effects and the loss of habitat or shelter and the consequent elimination of 
ecologically important species.7 Such pollution likewise impacts the lives of 
people living nearby and more particularly those persons whose livelihoods 
depend on harvesting resources from the sea.  
Ships have historically been afforded right of entry into ports or any other waters 
which they are closest to in order to be able to “ride out a storm or undertake 
repairs before continuing a voyage”.8 However recent state practice illustrates 
that coastal states are now generally reluctant to allow ships in distress into their 
territorial waters or ports for fear of the potential pollution that might result.9 This 
recent state practice seems to be a change to the long accepted international 
customary law rule which saw requests for refuge very rarely being refused.10 
The reluctance to grant a place of refuge is primarily driven by the prioritisation 
of that coastal state’s interests in protecting its own marine environment, over 
the interests of the ship seeking refuge. Whilst granting a place of refuge to a 
ship in distress may reduce the likelihood and extent of pollution, such risk 
cannot fully be mitigated. There is therefore a chance that notwithstanding the 
place of refuge being granted, a pollution incident may occur. This explains the 
perceived reluctance to grant a place of refuge. 
                                                          
6
 Fields Safety and Shipping 1912-2012 From the Titanic to the Costa Concordia 2. 
7
 Ceyhun 2014 European Scientific Journal 1. 
8
 Chircop A “Ships in distress, Environmental threats to Coastal States, and Places of refuge:  new 
directions for an ancient regime?” 2002 (33) Ocean Development & International Law 208. 
9 Examples of refusals taken from Morrison A Place of Refuge for Ships in Distress- Problems and 
Methods of Resolution (2012) Martinus Nijohoff Publishers The Netherlands 15 and include the 
following: Urquiola (1978), Christos Bitas (1978), Andros Patria (1978), Atlantic Express (1979). Also See 
Nordquist M International Law Governing Places of Refuge for Tankers Threatening pollution of Coastal  
Environments in Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes Martinus Nijoff 2007 
505-519.   
10
 Chircop 2002 Ocean Development & International law 208. 
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Recent state practice seems to evidence a “not in my backyard” approach to 
providing places of refuge to ships in distress where there is an environmental 
risk.11 Where coastal states refuse entry into places of refuge, these ships in 
distress are obliged to move to the next closest state and ‘beg for entry’, all the 
while increasing the likelihood and severity of a pollution incident.12 In this 
context, these ships have been called “leper ships”.13 
The debate around the perceived change in state practice in granting places of 
refuge is an important one and there are a number of examples of requests for 
refuge by ships in distress being refused by coastal states.14 There have been 
three notable maritime incidents since 1999 concerning this issue.15 These were 
the incidents of the Erika, the Castor and the Prestige.  All three were involved in 
maritime incidents, all had requested a place of refuge and had that request 
refused.16  
As will be clear from an analysis of the facts and consequences of the above 
three examples, there is a distinct conflict and competition between the rights of 
the ship (ship owners) and the rights of the coastal state. As it stands, modern 
state practice seems to indicate that coastal states prioritise their own interests 
above that of the ships.  
As mentioned above, historic international customary law shows that ships in 
distress had a right to seek refuge within the sovereign waters of state. Likewise, 
there was a correlating duty on the coastal state to receive these ships and 
provide certain immunities from the governing law.17 The reluctance to grant 
places of refuge for ships in distress signifies a possible change in opinio juris.  
                                                          
11
 Chircop 2002 Ocean Development & International law 207. 
12




 See footnote 9 for  further examples. 
15
 Other examples include the Napoli in 2007, the Stolt Valor in 2012 and the Flaminia in 2012. 
16
 Chircop 2002 Ocean Development & International law 207; Frank V “Consequences of the Prestige 
Sinking for European and International Law” 2005 (20) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
1. 
17
 Chircop A “Living with Ships in Distress – a new IMO Decision –Making Framework for the Requesting 
and Granting of Refuge” 2004 (3) World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 31-33. 
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The predominant source of rules pertaining to the Law of the Sea is the United 
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).18 UNCLOS represents, to 
a large degree, a codification of the law of the sea and is seen to be accepted by 
the international community as representing international customary law.19 
UNCLOS would therefore be fundamental starting point in determining whether 
there is an established right for a ship in distress  to be granted a place of 
refuge. That being said, it is notable that there is no express general 
international law obligation on a coastal state, outside of specific treaty law, 
compelling the assistance of ships in distress outside of the rescue of crew.20  
The current state practice seems to indicate that states enjoy the benefit of not 
being legally obliged to grant ships in distress a place of refuge within their 
sovereign waters where there is no risk to human life.  Aside from some moral 
consciousness these states seemingly bear no responsibility for the 
consequences of their refusal. This state practice seems to flow from the 
concept of sovereignty and the fact, as is argued by coastal states, states enjoy 
the authority to make and enforce their own laws and political agenda within 
their sovereign waters.21 This is the context within which this dissertation seeks 
to explore the question of whether coastal states are obliged in terms of current 
international law to grant places of refuge to ships in distress. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation will begin with a discussion of the concepts of 
ships in distress and places of refuge taking cognisance of the development of 
these concepts. Particular emphasis will be on the competing interests between 
coastal states and the interests of the ship to seek refuge in order to introduce 
and discuss the problem of ships in distress.  
Chapter 3 will discuss the nature and extent of coastal state sovereignty within 
the internal and territorial waters in so far as the prevention of pollution is 
                                                          
18
  The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
1833 UNTS (entered into force 16 November 1994). 
19 
Tanaka Y The International Law of the Sea (2012) Cambridge University Press United Kingdom 264. 
20
 MV Toledo (ACT Shipping (OTE) Ltd v Minister for the Marine, Ireland and the Attorney-General 1995 2 
ILRM. 
21
 Tanaka The International Law of the Sea 17. 
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concerned. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the legislative and 
enforcement rights and duties of coastal states in the prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution of the marine environment. This analysis will be in terms of 
UNCLOS and other applicable International Conventions with the inclusion of 
other provisions of international law. The duty on states to protect the marine 
environment will thereafter be discussed and placed in the context of the 
problem ships in distress and the previous discussions of sovereignty.  
Chapter 4 will discuss whether coastal states are obliged to grant places of 
refuge to ships in distress where there is a risk to the environment. This 
discussion will be placed in the context of the coastal states’ rights and 
obligations relative to the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution. 
The IMO Guidelines will be discussed to analyse whether same add any value 
to the topic being discussed and to what end such guidelines indicate further 
development on this issue.  
Chapter 5 will conclude with a summary of the current status of international law 
and whether there in fact is an obligation on coastal states to provide a place of 





Chapter 2: Ships in distress and places of refuge 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter begins a discussion of the concepts of ‘ships in distress’ and 
‘places or refuge’. This chapter seeks to highlight the development of the 
concept of ‘ships in distress’ to that of ‘ships in need of assistance’ and set out 
the change in the traditional rights of refuge afforded to such ships. This chapter 
thereafter sets out the current issues relating to ships in need of assistance and 
the identification of the various and often competing interests involved and how 
these interests have influenced the development of the above concepts.   
2.2 Ships in Distress /  in Need of Assistance 
 
No matter how prepared, skilled and diligent seafarers conduct themselves in 
the navigation of the world’s oceans, accidents will always happen.22 It is a 
matter of fact that ships do find themselves in situations of distress or difficulty 
where external assistance is needed in order to rescue the persons on board, to 
secure the vessel or to safeguard the cargo. Broadly speaking, these ships are 
called ‘ships in distress’. 
In light of the imminent danger caused by situations of distress, International law 
applies particular rules as to what constitutes distress and to what end, as is 
discussed further on in this dissertation, the particular ship may be granted 
immunity from liability in respect of breaching local coastal state laws.23  
The Eleanor Case is regarded a classic example of where the court analysed 
the concept of distress.24 Lord Stowell set out four criteria for proving distress in 
the 1809 Eleanor Case.25 Firstly the distress must be urgent and something of 
                                                          
22
 Timagenis CMI Yearbook 2003 376. 
23
 Tanaka The International Law of the Sea 264. 
24





grave necessity. Secondly there must at least be a moral necessity. Thirdly it 
must not be a distress which is self-created. Fourth, the distress must be proved 
by the claimant in a clear and satisfactory manner.26 Lord Stowell held that 
“irresistible distress must at times be a sufficient passport for human beings” into 
a place of refuge.27   The focus of the notion of distress and the formulation of 
the requirements was to save the lives of the persons on board.28  
There has however been some development of the concept of distress. It is 
recognised that distress could include risk to the marine environment. This is 
supported by the 1995 Toledo Case which accepted that is was modern practice 
in international law to distinguish between circumstances where there is a 
humanitarian risk (being the safety of the crew) and where the risk is primarily 
economic (that of the vessel and cargo).29 This differentiation is important in 
whether there is an obligation on coastal states to grant a place of refuge to that 
distressed ship. It was held in the 1995 Toledo Case that where there is a risk to 
human life, there is an obligation to grant a place of refuge. However, the Court 
held that a coastal state may lawfully refuse access if there is no risk to human 
life and there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk 
of substantial harm to the marine environment.30  
Further to the differentiation noted in the Toledo Case, the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) has broadened the definition of distress further by 
introducing the term ‘ships in need of assistance’.31 ‘Ships in need of assistance’ 
are differentiated from ‘ships in distress’ by the fact that there is no risk to the 
persons on board. The risk is a potential loss of the vessel or cargo giving rise to 
an environmental or navigational hazard.32 This precise formulation of ‘ships in 
                                                          
26
 Tanaka The International Law of the Sea 81 quoting The Eleanor Case 1809 165 English Reports 1068. 
27
 The Eleanor Case 1809 165 English Reports 1068. 
28
 D Devine “Ships in Distress – A judicial contribution from the South Atlantic” 1996 (37) Marine Policy 
229. 
29





 IMO Guidelines Article 1.19. 
32
 IMO Guidelines Article 1.18. 
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need of assistance’ by the IMO is a relatively recent development and is 
understood in this dissertation to be a subcategory of the broader concept of 
distress.  
The differentiation between ships in distress and ships in need of assistance is 
important as the concept of ships in need of assistance is a modern 
development on the traditionally established concept of ships in distress. As will 
be discussed below, ships in distress were traditionally afforded certain rights 
and immunities under international customary law. The differentiation is 
therefore relevant in the analysis of whether the traditional customary law rights 
afforded to ships in distress are equally afforded to ships in need of assistance. 
This dissertation is not intended to deal with the rules applicable to the rescue of 
persons on board which is largely reflected in the International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Convention on Maritime Search 
and Rescue.33 The particular focus of this dissertation is whether there is an 
obligation on coastal states to offer places of refuge to ships in need of 
assistance where there is a risk of environmental harm.  
2.3 Places of refuge  
 
The term ‘place of refuge’ is a modern take on a “firmly entrenched and time 
hallowed” custom where ships in distress were afforded safe havens, 
sanctuaries and shelter from the elements with the intention to protect the ship 
and the persons on board.34  Traditionally ships in distress were afforded an 
exceptional right of shelter in the territorial waters of a coastal as a result of 
some type of distress or force majeure such as bad weather, crew safety or 
mutiny.35 These places of refuge were traditionally found within the ports of 
coastal states and the term ‘port of refuge’ was generally used in this regard.36 
                                                          
33
 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979. 
34
 D Devine 1996 Marine Policy 229; Chircop A & Linden O Places of refuge for Ships – Emerging 
Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (2006) Martinus Nijoff Publishers The Netherlands 1. 
35
 Chircop 2002 Ocean Development & International law 212. 
36
 Chircop  et al Places of refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom 7. 
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This was due to the fact that, traditionally, in order to save the persons on board 
the ship had to be taken into port. As will be discussed below, this is no longer a 
strict necessity. Accordingly a ship could be granted entry into a bay or some 
other sheltered area and the persons on board could be airlifted to safety. 
Places of refuge could therefore be within a port or any other sheltered area 
within the coastal state’s waters. These places of refuge would, due to their 
locality, generally be found within either the internal (waters landward of the 
baseline) or territorial waters (within 12 nautical miles from the baseline) of a 
coastal state. 
From an environmental point of view, places of refuge allow for the mitigation of 
potential marine pollution caused by a maritime incident and are akin to 
designated reception facilities for pollution control.37 It is stated that ships which 
are leaking oil (or other pollutants) cause less pollution when such ships are in 
easily accessible areas as anti-pollution measures can be taken more easily and 
are therefore more effective.38 The best way to prevent damage from a maritime 
incident is therefore to ensure that those pollutants remain contained within the 
ship and the ship remains afloat.39 A place of refuge allows ships in need of 
assistance to make the necessary repairs or be salvaged under less extreme 
conditions therefore increasing the likelihood of success and reducing the 
likelihood of a potential pollution incident. This is what places of refuge are 
intended to achieve.  
2.4 The Traditional Right to Refuge under International 
Customary Law 
 
Before the development of modern methods of rescuing persons from a ship in 
distress, the main way of saving persons on board the ship was to ensure that 
the particular ship itself was saved. In this way the safety of persons on board 
                                                          
37




 Shaw R “Places of Refuge, International Law in the Making ?” 2003 CMI Yearbook 2003 329. 
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was inextricably connected to the safety of the ship itself.40 This is the 
background upon which the above concept developed. The right of entry for 
ships in distress was primarily focussed on the protection of persons on board 
and was in that way a predominantly humanitarian focussed concept.41  
It was generally recognised that a ship in distress would have the exceptional 
right of entry in times of distress as Lord Stowell held in the 1809 Eleanor Case 
that “irresistible distress must at times be a sufficient passport for human beings” 
into a place of refuge.42 The 1995 Toledo Case recognised that there was a 
generally recognised right of refuge for the purposes of saving the lives of the 
crew and which developed from international customary law over centuries.43 
The traditional right of entry would entitle a ship in distress to be allowed entry 
into a port or sheltered waters in order to attend to repairs, bring on fresh water, 
resupply and leave the port at its own will.44 Importantly, the ship was exempted 
from the jurisdiction of the coastal state for any offences committed outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of the coastal state.45 These exceptional rights of entry 
applied to all ships even where the flag state and the coastal state were at 
war.46  
Chircop states that there was general acceptance of the above mentioned 
exceptional rights of entry in time of distress until about 60 years ago when 
coastal states began to question the exceptional right of entry where the lives of 
the persons on board were not at risk.47 The development of modern rescue 
methods now meant that the persons on board could be rescued without having 
to save the ship and bring it into port. This change in attitude is reflected in the 
                                                          
40
 Chircop 2004  World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs  31-33. 
41
 D Devine 1996 Marine Policy 229. 
42
 The Eleanor Case 1809 165 English Reports at 1068. 
43
 MV Toledo (ACT Shipping (OTE) Ltd v Minister for the Marine, Ireland and the Attorney-General 1995 2 
ILRM. 
44
  Chircop 2004  World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs 31-33. 
45
 Yang H Jurisdiction of the Coastal State over Foreign Merchant Ships in Internal Waters and the 
Territorial Sea (2006) Springer Berlin 65-67. 
46
 Chircop & Linden Places of refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom 
190-191. 
47
 Chircop 2004 World Maritime University Journal of Maritime Affairs  34. 
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1995 Toledo Case which accepted that there is a modern practice of coastal 
states to distinguish between circumstances where there is a humanitarian risk 
and where the risk is only in respect of the vessel or cargo.48 The Toledo Case 
held that a coastal state may lawfully refuse a request for refuge if there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk of substantial 
harm.49  
From the analysis of the above it is clear that traditional customary international 
law was mainly focussed on the protection of human life on board. It is also 
important to note that the customary law right of entry in times of distress did not 
contemplate situations where the risk is one of harm to the marine environment 
and not to human life. As was discussed above the change in terminology from 
ships in distress to ships in need of assistance reflects this change in the 
traditional right of refuge. As international customary law did not contemplate 
ships in need of assistance for the protection of marine environment, further 
legal bases need to be explored to in order to establish whether there is an 
obligation on coastal states to grant a place of refuge to ships in need of  
assistance. 
2.5 The problem of ships in need of assistance   
 
It has been recognised that “the longer a damaged ship is forced to remain at 
the mercy of the elements in the open sea, the greater the risk of the vessel’s 
condition deteriorating or the sea, weather or environmental situation changing 
and thereby becoming a greater potential hazard”.50 The potential hazard could 
manifest in the loss of the vessel, the cargo, persons on board and could 
thereafter result in a pollution incident. As stated earlier, the focus of this 
dissertation is the potential for harm to the marine environment.  
                                                          
48





 IMO Guidelines Article 1.19 . 
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Granting a place of refuge to ships in need of assistance can be an essential 
mitigating factor of the likelihood and extent of pollution from a ship. That being 
said, the mere granting of this place of refuge cannot guarantee that marine 
pollution will be totally avoided. It is therefore still possible that there will be a 
pollution incident within the place of refuge. This therefore places the coastal 
state in the position where there is a chance that it may suffer harm as a result 
of allowing a ship in need of assistance to seek refuge within its territorial waters 
or port. The coastal state therefore assumes a portion of risk when granting a 
place of refuge to ships in need of assistance. That being said, should a 
pollution incident occur within a place of refuge the extent of the pollution 
resultant therefrom may be reduced.51 The risk of a pollution incident impacts 
the interests of the coastal state. That being said there are a number of other 
interested parties involved in the decision whether or not to grant a placeof 
refuge. 
There are three broad groups of interests involved: the ship’s interests 
(particularly the owners, salvors, charterers and insurers of the ships) in saving 
the vessel and cargo, the interests of the coastal state to preserve its own 
coastlines and the common interest of all other states in the health of the marine 
environment.52  
Persons interested in saving the ship and its cargo are made up of the ship 
owners, the owners of the cargo, the insurers of the ship (or cargo), the 
charterers and the crew. This group is primarily driven by economic interests 
and focussed on ensuring that the vessel and cargo reaches the designated 
destination in a safe manner. As was discussed above, the chances of saving 
the ship and the cargo is greatly increased and the risk of pollution (and the 
consequent possible liability) is minimised if a place of refuge is granted by the 
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coastal state. This group is therefore very much in favour of the granting of a 
place of refuge to ships in need of assistance.53 
The coastal states, coastal communities, port authorities and national 
governments are particularly concerned with the preservation of the local marine 
environment and minimising the effects of pollution.54 The consequences of 
serious pollution could impact the coastal state’s fisheries, mariculture, tourism 
and the general health and wellbeing of those persons living along the coastline. 
Coastal states are understandably reluctant to grant a place of refuge to ships in 
need of assistance for fear of compromising their own interests.55  
Other states, especially neighbouring states, would have an interest in a coastal 
state granting a place of refuge. Firstly, where the place of refuge is refused the 
ship in need of assistance will in all likelihood seek refuge from the next nearest 
coastal state. The refusal by state A would therefore make the ship a problem 
for state B to deal with. Secondly, where pollution is discharged into the ocean, 
such pollution can easily spread beyond the territorial waters of state A and into 
the territorial waters of state B. The transboundary nature of pollution is 
especially notable in areas such as the Mediterranean where there are many 
states sharing a particular body of water.56 Other coastal states, whether 
through owning ships or as a flag state, have an interest in the preservation of 
the global marine environment as a means to generate income through 
harvesting its resources and as an economical means of transporting goods.  
The problem arises where a coastal state’s decision is to refuse a place of 
refuge and prioritise its own interests. This may cause, or significantly contribute 
to, a pollution incident. Had the coastal state afforded a place of refuge the 
overall harm suffered may have been reduced. As discussed above recent state 
practice seems to suggest that coastal states are generally reluctant to grant 
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places of refuge. The Erika, the Castor and the Prestige are all good examples 
of such reluctance and the resultant negative consequences.  
In December 1999, the Erika experienced a structural failure and sank in bad 
weather in the Bay of Biscay resulting in environmental and socioeconomic 
harm for local French coastal communities.57. The 30 884 tons of oil spilled into 
the sea. Due to the type of substance and the poor weather conditions, the 
pollution was particularly difficult to contain resulting in the soiling of several 
hundred kilometres of coastline.58 One of the issues raised by the Erika accident 
was whether it should have been given refuge in France despite the local port 
authority refusing entry and the ship requesting a place of refuge.  
In December 2000 the Castor was transporting 30 000 tonnes of unleaded 
gasoline and from Romania to Nigeria when it required salvage in bad weather 
off the coast of Morocco.59 The salvors were refused refuge to safer waters in 
order to unload the cargo and undertake repairs by seven Mediterranean coastal 
states.60 The stricken ship navigated approximately 1000 miles for over 30 days 
as a "leper ship" before the cargo could be discharged off the coast of Tunisia 
and Malta.61The Castor was then towed to Greece which granted the ship a 
place of refuge on the condition that the gasoline was offloaded.62  
The November 2002 Prestige accident was very similar to the Erika incident 
both being older ships and both carrying ‘black product’ in this case 77 000 tons 
of Russian heavy fuel oil.63 After initially experiencing difficulties on 13 
November 2002 and after airlifting the crew to safety, the ship’s Master and 
salvors attempted to save the ship for six days.64 During this time the numerous 
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requests for a place of refuge were refused by Spain and Portugal.65 On 19 
November 2002 the Prestige broke in two due to six days of severe weather and 
sank 133 nautical miles of the northwest coast of Spain.66 The sinking of the 
Prestige was the catalyst for change in the area of places of refuge 
internationally and notably within the European Union.67 
The Prestige accident highlighted the fact that there was a lack of a clear legal 
regime for dealing with ships in distress.68 It further highlighted the absence of a 
legal duty on coastal states to assist ships in distress by granting a place of 
refuge.69 The general opinion is that if Spain granted a place of refuge to the 
Prestige during the early stages of the accident, the eventual consequences 
could have been avoided.70 
2.6 Concluding remarks on ships in need of assistance 
 
From the above Chapter it is submitted that there is still a duty to provide a place 
of refuge to ships in distress in international customary law where there is a risk 
to human life. However with the advances of modern technology it is no longer 
necessary to grant distressed ships a place of refuge in order to save the 
persons on board. There is therefore an increasing category of ships that are ‘in 
need of assistance’ rather than ‘in distress’ as there is no risk to human life. The 
focus of this dissertation deals with these ships in need  of assistance which 
also pose a risk to the marine environment and which are increasingly being 
refused a place of refuge. The question is whether this state practice is in line 
with the coastal states’ obligation to provide places of refuge in international law.  
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Chapter 3: The Coastal State’s Rights and Duties in 




The previous Chapter introduced and discussed the problem of ships in need of 
assistance and highlighted the competing interests involved. This Chapter will 
discuss the nature and extent of coastal state sovereignty within both internal 
and territorial waters in so far as the prevention of pollution is concerned in order 
to highlight the rights and duties within the two maritime zones. The duty on 
states to protect the marine environment will thereafter be discussed as a factor 
that limits sovereignty and placed in the context of the problem ships in need of 
assistance. This Chapter will conclude with a discussion as to whether the 
exercise of sovereignty in refusing to grant a place of refuge is commensurate 
with a coastal state’s duty to protect the environment. In other words this 
Chapter explores whether the emerging trend to refuse ships in need of 
assistance places of refuge is in line with international law.  
3.2 Coastal State Sovereignty  
 
One of the fundamental principles of international law generally is that of 
sovereignty.71 In the context of the law  of the sea, the principle of sovereignty is 
the counterpoint to the principle of freedom of navigation and seeks to safeguard 
the interests of the coastal state.72 The principle of sovereignty gives rise to the 
extension of national jurisdiction into offshore spaces and supports the 
territorialisation of the oceans.73  
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The exercise of sovereignty within a coastal state’s waters is however not 
absolute and can be limited by bilateral treaties and also judicial decisions such 
as the Corfu Channel Case where it was held that a state is not allowed to 
knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other 
states.74 There are therefore certain limits and compromises within international 
law, specifically UNCLOS, that govern the exercise of sovereign rights by the 
coastal state. Furthermore, such sovereign rights and obligations are different 
depending on the specific maritime zones. The focus of this dissertation is on 
places of refuge. These places are commonly found within the internal or 
territorial waters of a coastal state. Accordingly the focus of this Chapter is on 
rights and obligations of coastal states in exercising sovereignty within these two 
maritime zones. 
3.2.1 Internal Waters under UNCLOS 
 
Internal waters refer to the waters landward of the baseline of the territorial sea 
and form part of the territory of the coastal state.75 In terms of international 
customary law and UNCLOS a coastal state has sovereignty of its land territory 
and its internal waters.76  Such internal waters (and therefore ports) are seen as 
an “appendage” of the coastal state where the coastal state is able to regulate 
such areas.77 Internal waters fall to be regulated in the same manner as the land 
territory (with certain limitations as set out below).78  
A foreign ship voluntarily entering the internal waters of a coastal state impliedly 
submits to the jurisdiction of that coastal state.79 The foreign ship is therefore 
subject to the current domestic laws in addition to the applicable flag state 
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laws.80 Foreign merchant vessels (the rules regarding warships are not the 
subject of this discussion) are subject to the coastal state's regulations on 
navigation, sanitary, fiscal, technical and customs controls.81 The only real 
limitation on the coastal state’s ability to adopt laws is the obligation to 
communicate such laws to the IMO where such laws result in a condition of 
entry into a port.82  
Article 220 of UNCLOS provides that a coastal state may prosecute a ship within 
its port that is believed to have infringed its own pollution laws whilst in the 
territorial waters. Article 218(1) extends this jurisdiction where there is evidence 
that the ship has contravened international pollution laws whilst outside of the 
internal waters, territorial waters or exclusive economic zone of the coastal 
state. The coastal state is required to detain all unseaworthy ships that pose a 
threat to the marine environment in terms of Article 219(1) of UNCLOS. 
By virtue of their usual location within the internal waters of a coastal state, ports 
fall within the area of sovereignty of coastal states and are therefore subject to 
full coastal state jurisdiction and control.83  As there is no general right to 
innocent passage through the internal waters of a coastal state (aside from the 
exceptions in Articles 8(2) and 34(1)) it is suggested that there is therefore no 
right of entry into a coastal state’s port.84 The above sovereignty rights therefore 
extend to the granting or refusal of access to a port in a similar manner in which 
access into the internal waters can be regulated.  
The non-existence of a general right of entry into the internal waters or a port of 
a coastal state has raised some debate in international law. The 1958 Aramco 
arbitration stated in obiter that as a matter of public international law, the ports of 
every state must be open to foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed 
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when the vital interests of the coastal state require.85 The views stated in the 
Armaco arbitration do not however accord with considerable jurisprudence to the 
contrary and as was also held in the 1986 case between Nicaragua v USA 
where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the sovereignty of the 
coastal state entitles the coastal state to regulate access to its ports.86 The 
views stated in the Armaco arbitration can really only point towards a 
presumption that ports would be open to foreign merchant ships as a matter of 
convenience of commerce and not as a legal right. La Fayette supports this view 
and states that there is no evidence that a coastal state in obliged to keep its 
port open to foreign ships unless the exception of genuine distress occurs.87  
As was discussed in Chapter 2, the traditional customary international law 
position supports the view that a foreign ship would be allowed access into a 
port in times of distress only as a necessary means to save the persons on 
board. As was discussed, this traditional customary international law position 
seems to have changed.  The current state of traditional customary international 
law does not therefore grant a right of access to a port to safeguard cargo or to 
protect the environment in the absence of saving human life. In this regard 
UNCLOS likewise does not confer any further rights of entry into internal waters 
for ships in need of assistance.  
Coastal states are able to regulate entry by ships in need of assistance into their 
internal waters and have the ability to take the necessary steps to prevent and 
breach of its laws for which entry into the internal waters is conditional.88 Coastal 
states may adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control 
of marine pollution.89 In the context of ships in need of assistance, it is submitted 
that coastal states are empowered to adopt laws and regulate access to internal 
waters as an exercise of sovereignty and as a means of pollution control. 
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3.2.2 Territorial Sea under UNCLOS 
 
Historically coastal states generally exercised jurisdiction over the waters 
adjacent to the coastline up to 3 nautical miles.90 This jurisdiction was utilised for 
the purposes of security, customs control, sanitary regulation and fisheries 
control.91 Conversely, a coastal state would not be entitled to exercise any 
jurisdiction past the 3 nautical mile limit and which area would be seen as the 
high seas.92 UNCLOS now clearly confirms that the breadth of the territorial sea 
cannot exceed 12 nautical miles from the baseline and that the sovereignty of 
coastal states extends beyond its land territory up to the limit of the territorial 
sea.93 The below discussion explores the powers of the coastal state in the 
context of ships in need of assistance. 
The coastal state can enact its own laws in its territorial sea in terms of Article 
21 of UNCLOS. These laws should not impair the right of innocent passage of 
foreign vessels nor should they apply to the Construction Design Engineering 
and Manning (CDEM) requirements of foreign ships unless such requirements 
are constant with the generally accepted international rules or standards.94 In 
principle, coastal states may be entitled to adopt laws which restrict entry into 
the territorial sea by ships in need of assistance. 
The coastal state’s power to regulate access by ships in need of assistance is 
evidenced in the wide legislative powers set out in UNCLOS. In terms of Article 
21 can enact the following relevant laws: (a) adopt laws regarding the safety of 
navigation: it can organize maritime traffic and passage of ships by drawing sea-
lanes and traffic separation schemes in its territorial sea; (d) adopt legislation 
regarding the conservation of living resources of its territorial sea; (f) ensure the 
preservation of the environment by adopting regulations on the prevention, 
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reduction and control of pollution.95 Ships  in need of assistance present both 
navigational and environmental hazards and coastal states are entitled through 
Article 21 of UNCLOS adopt laws which may be a legal basis for refusing 
access to ships in need of assistance.  
The powers in Article 21 of UNCLOS are further bolstered by Article 211 (4) of 
UNCLOS which grants the coastal sate the power to exercise its sovereignty 
within the territorial sea and adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution from foreign vessels. This power 
extends to all foreign vessels including those exercising innocent passage. The 
caveat to this power is that this legislative jurisdiction may not hamper innocent 
passage.  
Article 220 of UNCLOS confirms the enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal state 
and confirms that where a vessel has violated the laws of the coastal state or 
the applicable international rules for the prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution, the coastal state may inspect, detain and institute proceedings against 
the ship in question.  
In the exercise of the above enforcement powers, the coastal state has a duty to 
avoid adverse consequences resultant therefrom. The coastal state is to ensure 
that it shall not endanger the “safety of navigation or otherwise create any 
hazard to a vessel, bring it to an unsafe port or anchorage, or expose the marine 
environment to an unreasonable risk”.96  
Coastal states therefore have nearly unlimited legislative and enforcement 
jurisdiction within their territorial waters in respect of pollution control. These 
wide legislative and enforcement powers may be utilised as a legal basis to 
regulate and refuse access to a place of refuge by a ship in need of assistance. 
Coastal states are really only limited from hampering innocent passage or the 
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enforcement of more stringent CDEM requirements when compared with the 
international standards.97  
The concept of innocent passage is a compromise between the concept of 
freedom of navigation and that of sovereignty.98 The concept of innocent 
passage therefore allows foreign ships to enter the territorial waters of a coastal 
state under certain conditions. In this way the freedom of navigation of that ship 
is balanced with the sovereign rights of the coastal state. The right of innocent 
passage exists as a “limitation and an exception to absolute coastal state 
sovereignty in the territorial sea”.99  
In terms of Article 17 of UNCLOS all ships enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial waters of a particular coastal state subject to the 
provisions of UNCLOS and specific rules applicable to innocent passage. A 
ship’s journey through the territorial waters of a coastal state would need to 
meet the requirements of ‘passage’ and would need to be innocent in nature.  
‘Passage’ is defined in Article 18 of UNCLOS as traversing the territorial sea 
without entering into the internal waters of the coastal state or proceeding to or 
from internal waters to call at a port facility or roadstead. In this way ‘passage’ is 
a temporary state of being where the territorial waters of that particular coastal 
state is not the final destination.100 In support of this understanding Article 18(2) 
of UNCLOS states that this passage must be “continuous and expeditious”. 
Ships are therefore generally not allowed to to 'hover' or cruise around in the 
territorial sea, because, irrespective of whether or not the ship’s conduct would 
be considered 'innocent', the ship would not be properly engaged in passage as 
is defined in UNCLOS.101  
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There is however one exception to the continuous and expeditious requirement. 
Passage can include stopping and anchoring where same are incidental to 
ordinary navigation, rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the 
purposes of rendering assistance to others in distress or danger.102 This is very 
relevant to the focus of this dissertation and will be discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter 4. 
As is clear from the above paragraphs there is a compromise between the 
coastal state’s sovereign rights of regulation and enforcement within the 
territorial sea and the rights of freedom of navigation bestowed on foreign ships 
traversing those territorial waters. One of the key compromises  is that of  
innocent passage which guarantees the right of innocent passage by a foreign 
ship through the territorial sea. However coastal states may interfere with a 
foreign ship claiming innocent passage where the passage is prejudicial to the 
peace and good order of the coastal state. That being said, it is clear from the 
above paragraphs that the coastal state may choose from a wide array of 
measures which directly and indirectly protect their territorial waters and 
coastline from vessel source pollution.   
3.3 Other applicable conventions 
 
Further to the rights encapsulated within UNCLOS there are a number of other 
relevant international conventions which provide further insight into the coastal 
state rights and obligations in the regulation of and protection from vessel 
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3.3.1 The Salvage Convention of 1989 
 
The Salvage Convention of 1989 came into force on 14 July 1996 and is aimed 
at determining uniform international rules regarding salvage operations.103 
Salvage operations are those activities aimed at assisting ships in danger and 
which therefore have an effect on the safety of vessels, property in danger and 
to the protection of the environment.104 Essentially salvage operations are 
executed under a contract between the party giving the assistance (the salvor) 
and the master of the ship. The salvor is required to attend to certain activities 
for which he will receive payment where there is a useful result.105   
The Salvage Convention does confer rights on a coastal state to take measures 
in accordance with generally recognised principles of international law to protect 
its coastline or related interests from pollution or the threat of pollution following 
upon a maritime casualty which may reasonably be expected to result in major 
harmful consequences.106 The coastal state may give directions in the execution 
of salvage operations which may include permission or refusal of a place of 
refuge to the particular ship in distress. It is important to note that Article 9 of the 
Salvage Convention specifically reserves the coastal state’s rights to protect 
their marine environment from pollution.   
The Salvage Convention does, however, impose certain responsibilities on the 
coastal state. Whenever a coastal state is involved in matters relating to salvage 
operations it must take into account the need for co-operation between salvors, 
other interested parties and public authorities in order to ensure the efficient and 
successful performance of salvage operations for the purpose of saving life or 
property in danger as well as preventing damage to the environment in 
general.107 This duty to co-operate is essential in the decision by a coastal state 
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as to whether a ship in distress is to be granted a place of refuge or admission 
into port. 
The Salvage Convention is not regarded as a basis for which a legal right of 
entry for foreign ships in need of assistance can be based. On the contrary, 
Morrison suggests that the wording of Article 9 (totally preserving the coastal 
states’ protection rights) read with the wording of Article 11 (merely providing for 
a duty to co-operate) may suggest that the Salvage Convention could be a basis 
in refusing access to ships in need of assistance.108  
As a counterpoint to Morrison’s suggestion, cognisance must be had of the 
general duties and considerations in the protection of the martin environment.  It 
is clear that the Salvage Convention recognises the importance of protecting the 
marine environment.109 This recognition is evident from the departure of the 
traditional ‘no cure no pay contracts to the allowance of ‘special compensation’ 
in Article 14 of the Salvage Convention. Where the salvor attended to salvage 
operations which prevented or minimized damage to the environment the salvor 
may be entitled to special compensation of the expenses incurred together with 
an additional 30% and where a tribunal deems fair, up to an additional 100% of 
the costs incurred.110 The establishment of ‘special compensation’ meant that 
salvors could at least recover their expenses and this creates an incentive for 
ship owners to participate in salvage operations where there is a threat to the 
environment.111  
The above being said, the contents of the Salvage Convention in the context of 
the duty to grant places of refuge and protection of the marine environment is 
“an uncertain mix of private and public law provisions within the Salvage 
Convention, and the public law provisions are, unfortunately, vague and 
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equivocal”.112 Whilst the comments by Mukherjee are valid, one could resolve 
these problems with reading the provisions of the Salvage Convention with the 
broader duty to protect the environment discussed below. This may well provide 
the necessary context from which more distinct duties can be distilled.   
 
3.3.2 OPRC Convention 1990 
 
The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
operation (OPRC) requires states to make precautionary plans for dealing with 
potential oil pollution incidents individually and also in collaboration with other 
states.113  The OPRC came into force in May 1995 and was amended by a 
protocol on Hazardous and Noxious Substances on 14 June 2007.114  
Parties have a duty to take all appropriate measures in accordance with the 
provisions of the OPRC to prepare for and respond to an oil pollution incident 
which poses or may pose a threat to the marine environment, or to the coastline 
or related interests of one or more states, and which requires emergency action 
or other immediate response.115 
The OPRC requires states to prepare oil pollution emergency plans, stockpile 
equipment needed to combat oil spills and to hold training exercises. All flag 
states are required to ensure that its ships have on board a shipboard oil 
pollution emergency plans which are subject to inspection whilst the ship is in 
port or at an offshore terminal.116 
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The OPRC does not specifically deal with places of refuge for ships in distress 
but “it does envisage the development by States of oil pollution response 
contingency plans, and some States have such plans which expressly provide 
for the possibility of admission to their ports or havens of ships in distress which 
may prove to threaten pollution”.117 Shaw notes that the OPRC links up with the 
duties of co-operation in Article 11 of the Salvage Convention.118 Further to this 
it is suggested that where states are party to both the Salvage Convention and 
the OPRC one could read these two conventions together. In doing this one 
could argue that the emergency plans required to be established under the 
OPRC need to be in line with the tenants of the duty to co-operate in order to 
prevent damage to the marine environment. 
3.3.3 The Intervention Convention 1969 
 
A classic example of coastal state intervention was the incident concerning the 
Torrey Canyon.119 The Torrey Canyon was a Liberian tanker which suffered an 
incident off the coast of the United Kingdom on the high seas in March1967 and 
spilled approximately 80 000 tons of crude oil into the ocean from pollution.120 
The tanker was abandoned by the owners and the United Kingdom destroyed 
the abandoned ship using bombs and napalm in an attempt to safeguard its 
coastline.121 This incident and the actions by the United Kingdom introduced a 
novel legal issue concerning the unilateral actions on the high seas of a state in 
an attempt to protect its own interests. It was not until this incident that that the 
whole world began to realise the seriousness and urgency of the problems of 
marine pollution and the complex legal issues needing to be addressed and 
clarified.122 There was clearly a need to establish a legal basis for a coastal state 
to be able to intervene and protect its own interests on the high seas in 
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international law. In response to the Torrey Canyon incident the The 
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties 1969 (The Intervention Convention) was concluded in 
order to deal with some of the deficiencies highlighted by the incident.  
The Intervention Convention entered into force on 6 May 1975 and allows states 
to take measures on the high seas as may be necessary to  prevent, mitigate or 
eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastlines from pollution.123  
The Intervention Convention places certain obligations onto the coastal state. 
The coastal state is obliged to first proceed and consult with other states 
affected by the incident in question and notify any person having an interest 
which can reasonably be affected by the proposed intervention measures to be 
taken by the coastal state.124 The coastal state is obliged to use its best 
endeavours to avoid any risk to human life and to afford assistance to any 
person in distress.125 It is however important to bear in mind that the measures 
taken by the coastal state under the Intervention Convention must be 
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage and not go beyond what is 
reasonably necessary to achieve the to  prevention, mitigation or elimination of 
grave and imminent danger to from pollution.126  
The actions taken by a coastal state pursuant to the Intervention Convention 
could include ordering a damaged ship to proceed or to be towed clear of a 
coastline threatened with pollution provided that the incident is firstly one that 
poses a grave an imminent danger and secondly that such action in in line with 
the requirements of Article 5 of the Intervention Convention.127 
There is a link to Article 221 of UNCLOS that is relevant to intervention 
measures by coastal states. UNCLOS permits the coastal state to take and 
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enforce measures beyond the territorial sea which are proportionate to the 
actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests which 
may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.128  
3.4 The duty to protect the Marine Environment under UNCLOS 
 
In addition to the rights and obligations relevant to the prevention and protection 
from pollution there exists an overarching duty on states to protect the marine 
environment. This duty informs, directs and limits the exercise of coastal state 
action and sovereignty in the context of pollution control.  
The obligation to protect the marine environment is explicitly set out in Articles 
192 to 195 of UNCLOS. The degree of acceptance and consensus expressed 
by states in negotiating the environmental provisions of UNCLOS suggest that 
the duties expressed therein represent definitive opinio juris and represent an 
agreed codification of existing principles.129 Due to the wide ratification of 
UNCLOS it is therefore stated that these duties and principles form part of 
international customary law.130 It is said that that the emergence of UNCLOS 
reflects a paradigm shift in international law from the freedom to pollute to an 
obligation to prevent pollution.131 The focus of UNCLOS is not on the obligations 
of responsibility for damage but rather on a general and comprehensive 
regulation on the prevention of pollution.132 In this way it rectifies the deficiencies 
of the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas rule discussed below.  
Article 192 of UNCLOS is titled “General obligation” and stipulates that “states 
have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment”. Coastal 
states have a general duty to protect the marine environment and harmonise 
                                                          
128
 Article 221 of UNCLOS.  
129
 Birnie P & Boyle A international Law and the Environment (2009) Oxford University Press United 
Kingdom 352. 
130
 Ibid 396. 
131





policies in this regard.133 This succinct obligation confirms the general obligation 
in an uncompromising manner. The duty expressed therein is not conditional; it 
is not limited to particular area and is focussed on preventative action by states. 
This duty is therefore of much wider application than that expressed in the Trail 
Smelter Case (discussed below) as it is not limited to areas under national 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the duty is expressed in a general manner. It is not 
limited to being in favour of a particular state. It is also noted that the duty does 
not only extend to states but to the marine environment as a whole.134 It is 
therefore submitted that coastal states are not only obliged to protect the marine 
environment within their own territorial waters but also have a broader duty to 
protect the marine environment as a whole. 
The limitation of state sovereignty is clear and unequivocal. Article 193 confirms 
“that states have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources in 
accordance” with their duty to “protect and preserve the marine environment”. 
There are two important considerations relative to this Article. Firstly, the fact 
that sovereignty is limited by an environmental duty clarifies a state’s jurisdiction 
and links same to the principles set out in the Stockholm and Rio 
Declarations.135 Secondly, the environmental duty is not only in respect of the 
marine environment within its jurisdiction, but to the marine environment as a 
whole. This solidifies the state’s duty to the international community of states to 
protect the marine environment.  
With reference to Articles 192 and 193 of UNCLOS it is difficult to reconcile 
adherence of the above general duty to protect the marine environment owed to 
all states and the act of a particular coastal state in refusing to grant a place of 
refuge. Evidence of maritime incidents proves that the refusal of a place of 
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refuge significantly increases the chances and extent of environmental harm.136 
It is submitted that a conscious decision by a coastal state to refuse a place of 
refuge in the full knowledge of the possible risks to the marine environment may 
be in violation of the general duty owed to all states to protect the marine 
environment.  
Article 194 (1) of UNCLOS places a positive duty on all states to take all 
appropriate measures that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment from any source. Article 194 (2) places an 
obligation on states to take measures to prevent pollution from activities under 
that sates control or jurisdiction which expands the Trail Smelter Arbitration 
principles in a similar fashion as Article 192. Article 194 (2) further obliges states 
to ensure that where a pollution does occur from incidents or activities under 
their control or jurisdiction does not spread beyond their sovereign areas. Article 
194 (2) must be read with Article 195 which confirms that states shall not directly 
or indirectly transfer pollution from one area to another. Article 195 refers not 
only to damage but also to hazards which can therefore be read so as to include 
possible damage. In this regard a ship in distress could be a hazard as there is a 
chance that there will be harm to the marine environment. 
Articles 194 and 195 are therefore of specific relevance to the debate on places 
of refuge. The act of refusing to grant a place of refuge may be in direct conflict 
with Articles 194 and 195 of UNLCOS as the usual result of the refusal is that 
the ship in in need of  assistance moves on to the next coastal state to beg for 
entry. The decision by the coastal state to refuse entry therefore may result in a 
transfer of a hazard or the eventual pollution of the marine environment.  
The definition of pollution as set out in Article 1 of UNCLOS means “the 
introduction…directly or indirectly of substances…into the marine 
environment…which results or is likely to result in…harm to living resources and 
marine life and hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities…and 
reduction of amenities”. It is submitted that the decision of refusing to grant a 
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place of refuge could constitute an act of indirect pollution. Such an act would be 
in direct conflict with the duties set out in Articles 192 to 195 of UNCLOS.  
It is submitted further that the refusal to grant a place of refuge is in direct 
conflict with the general duty to protect the marine environment and not to 
transfer such pollution to another area. It is submitted such conduct could 
constitute an act of deliberate pollution. It is for these reasons that it is submitted 
that such conduct by a coastal state may constitute an abuse of right under 
Article 300 of UNCLOS.  
3.5 Other Environmental Duties under International Law  
 
In addition to the above mentioned limitations on the sovereignty rights of 
coastal states under UNCLOS there are international law principles which 
further inform and limit the exercise of coastal state sovereignty and measures 
against marine pollution.  
3.5.1 The duty not to cause harm  
 
One of the most important principles to be considered is that no state has the 
right to use or permit the use of its own territory in such a manner which causes 
harm to another state or its people. This principle was upheld in the 1938 Trail 
Smelter Arbitration as a confirmation of the customary law rule of sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas (use your own property so as not to injure that of 
another).137 It was held that if a state allows an activity to occur within an area 
under its jurisdiction and such activity causes harm to another state, the 
polluting state will be liable.  
The exercise of sovereignty by a coastal state within the territorial sea would 
easily fall into a ‘use’ of its territory. Accordingly, where a coastal state refuses to 
grant a place of refuge as an exercise of sovereignty it can be said that the 
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coastal state is ‘using’ or ‘exercising power over an area within which it has 
jurisdiction’.  
As was discussed in Chapter 2 the refusal to grant a place of refuge to a ship in 
need of assistance will likely increase the chances of a pollution incident 
occurring and harm being suffered within the territorial waters of another coastal 
state. In such an example, it therefore can be said that the coastal state’s use of 
its territory in refusing to grant a place of refuge could cause harm to an area 
under the jurisdiction of another coastal state.  
In such circumstances and using the principles stated in the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration, one could argue that the refusal by a coastal state to grant a place of 
refuge conflicts with the duty not to cause harm to another state. Flowing 
therefrom it can be argued that coastal states are not entitled to refuse ships in 
need of assistance access to a place of refuge within their territorial sea.  
The 1949 Corfu Channel Case clearly states that every state has an obligation 
not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
other states.138 In this regard the 1996 International Court of Justice advisory 
opinion concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
supported this and expanded same by stating there is a general obligation on 
states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
environment of other states.139 
The focus of the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas rule and the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration ruling was on pollution occurring and harm being suffered within 
respective territories of states. The polluting activity must have occurred within 
an area under the jurisdiction of a state and the harm must be to an area under 
the jurisdiction of another state. There is therefore a limited application of this 
principle in the context of pollution. The refusal of access must be in relation to 
the coastal sate’s internal waters or territorial sea and the harm must occur 
within the internal waters or territorial sea of the other coastal state. If the 
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pollution harm occurs only within, say, the exclusive economic zone of other 
state or the high seas, the Trail Smelter Arbitration principles will not apply. As 
was discussed above Articles 192 and 194 UNCLOS have remedied this 
limitation.  
3.5.2 The 1972 Stockholm Declaration  
 
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration confirms that states have the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or 
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.140 
It is said that the care for the world’s oceans has been a matter needing 
international co-operation and agreement since the dawn of civilisation.141 Such 
co-operation and agreement is brought about by the fact that all states have an 
interest in the world’s oceans. Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
draws on the principle laid down in the Trail Smelter Arbitration and supports the 
idea that a coastal state’s decision to refuse a place of refuge as an exercise of 
its sovereignty may, depending on the circumstances, not be acceptable. 
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration was repeated verbatim in 
Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration which highlighted the concept of 
‘common concern’ as a means to designate those issues which involve global 
responsibilities.  Principle 7 thereof confirms that states shall co-operate in a 
spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth's ecosystem and that states have common but 
differentiated responsibilities.142 These common concerns are universal in 
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nature and require the common action of all states in order for protective 
measures to work.143  
Whilst the Stockholm and Rio Declarations are considered to be ‘soft law’ and 
non-binding, the principles set out therein should inform the discussion on 
coastal state duties in respect of ships in need of assistance and whether a 
refusal of a place of refuge is in line with these recognised principles.  
3.6 Concluding Remarks on Coastal State Rights & Obligations 
 
The concept of sovereignty is fundamental in providing a legal basis through 
which coastal states can regulate shipping activities so as to deal with pollution 
incidents and take such measures as may be necessary to deal with the effects 
of pollution. Coastal state have extensive competency to regulate access to their 
internal and territorial waters and to intervene with ships in need of assistance 
which have contravened the applicable laws. This coastal state’s intervention 
may include refusal of access to a particular maritime zone, detention and 
prosecution of an offending party and expulsion of the particular foreign ship 
from the coastal state’s sovereign waters. These rights are clearly set out in 
international customary and conventional law and may provide a legal basis for 
a coastal state to refuse access to ships in need of assistance. 
The wide coastal state legislative and enforcement competency set out above is 
however not unlimited. Coastal state rights are curtailed and balanced against 
the rights of other states through specific obligations placed on the coastal state 
in the exercise of its own rights. A key limitation on the coastal state’s 
sovereignty is that of the right of innocent passage.144 The right of innocent 
passage balances the foreign ship’s right of freedom of navigation against the 
sovereign rights of the coastal state. Conventional international law also 
provides a basis from which coastal state sovereignty is limited and introduces 
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concepts of protection of the marine environment, notice, reporting, 
preparedness and co-operation. These concepts inform and contextualise the 
rights of the coastal state in the regulation and control of marine pollution.  
What the following Chapter seeks to achieve is to analyse a coastal state’s 
rights and obligations in the context of places of refuge for ships in need of 
assistance so as to establish whether coastal states are obliged to grant such 




Chapter 4 – Ships in Environmental Distress – A right to 
refuge? 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This Chapter seeks to evaluate the rights and duties of coastal states in modern 
international law of the sea with a view of ascertaining whether a  coastal state 
is obliged to grant a place of refuge to ships in need of assistance where there in 
only a risk of environmental damage. Conversely the question is whether ships 
in need of assistance have the right to enter a port, the internal or territorial 
waters of a coastal state for the purposes of seeking refuge. It has been stated 
that there is no simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to this question and there are a wide 
range  of views  on this matter.145 The complexity involved in answering this 
question is partly due to the fact that the rules applicable to ships in distress 
(and more recently in respect of ships in need of assistance) have historically 
been derived from different fields of international law. These different fields 
include trade law, humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, admiralty law, the 
law of the sea and more recently international environmental law.146 What 
follows is an analysis of the above posed question in the context of the internal 
and territorial waters of a coastal state and to whether the obligation to grant a 
place of refuge exists.  
4.2 Refuge in Internal Waters 
 
The fundamental characteristic of internal waters is that of sovereignty. This 
maritime zone is regarded as an extension of the state’s territorial 
sovereignty.147 As set out in Chapter 3 there exists extensive legislative and 
enforcement competency in favour of the coastal state. Coastal states are able 
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to regulate entry by foreign ships into their internal waters and are empowered 
to take the necessary steps to prevent and breach of its laws for which entry into 
the internal waters is conditional.  The key question relevant to internal waters is 
whether there is a right of access by a ship in need of assistance into the 
internal waters of a coastal state for seeking refuge or otherwise. Granting a 
right of access to a ship in need of assistance would result in an exception to the 
principle of sovereignty.148  A ship in need of assistance requesting access as a 
right would need to show that there is a valid legal basis from which that right 
exists so as to limit the coastal state’s sovereignty.149  
A means of establishing this legal basis could be that there 1) exists a general 
right to access a coastal state’s internal waters or ports, 2) that in times of 
distress  there exists an exceptional right of  access or 3)  that the coastal state 
owes a duty to protect the marine environment and thereby is required to grant 
access in order  to mitigate any possible marine pollution. Items 1 and 2 are now 
discussed in turn with item 3 being discussed in general thereafter.  
4.2.1 General Right of Access to Internal Waters or a Port   
 
In stark contrast to the legal regime regulating territorial waters, there is no 
established right of innocent passage through the internal waters of a coastal 
state aside from the exceptions in Articles 8(2) and 34(1) of UNCLOS which are 
not of relevance here. Accordingly there needs to be a clear legal right of entry 
into these waters in favour of the ship in need of assistance. If it can be shown 
that there exists a legal right of access then by implication there would 
automatically be a right of refuge for a ships in need of assistance. To establish 
a general right of entry such right would have to exist either in international 
customary law or by virtue of conventional law.  
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From a practical viewpoint ports are open to merchant ships so as to allow for 
international trade.150 La Fayette states that there is a presumption that ports 
would be open to merchant ships as a matter of convenience and commercial 
interest however not as a legal right.151 In support thereof Chircop states that in 
terms of international customary law there is no longer a general right of access 
as an absolute right.152  
Using UNCLOS as a proxy of generally regarded international custom it is 
important to note that there is no guaranteed right of entry into a port or internal 
waters. In the context of ships in need of assistance Article 211(3) of UNCLOS 
confirms that coastal states may establish particular rules for the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution and make same a condition for entry into a 
port. It is also noted that UNCLOS does not carve out special treatment for ships 
in need of assistance in respect of access to internal waters as it does under 
territorial waters (as is discussed below). 
Since ports form part of the internal waters of coastal states, such coastal states 
are allowed to exercise their sovereignty when considering granting access to 
ships in need of assistance.153 In terms of international customary law it is 
therefore submitted that there does not exist a general right of access into a port 
for the purposes of seeking refuge or otherwise.  
In terms of international conventional law there do exist certain bilateral and 
multilateral treaties which are relevant to granting a general right of access. 
Parties to a bilateral treaty are well within their rights to agree to limit their 
sovereignty and grant an absolute right of access to each other. Generally such 
treaties are put in place to stimulate international trade and good inter-
governmental relations.154 It is notable that from the majority of bilateral 
agreements put in place there was no agreed and established right of access to 
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a port.155 The majority of these bilateral treaties focussed on clauses granting 
favourable treatment to the contracting parties’ ships but falling short of 
establishing an absolute right of access.156 
From a multi-lateral treaty perspective the Ports Convention of 1923 dealt with 
access to ports.157 In terms of Article 2 of the Statute to the Ports Convention 
and subject to the principle of reciprocity, every Contracting States undertakes 
to grant the vessels of every other Contracting State equality of treatment with 
its own vessel as regards freedom of access to the port, the use of the port, and 
the full enjoyment of the benefits as regards navigation and commercial 
operations which it affords to vessels, their cargoes and passengers.158 Whilst 
Article 2 of the Statute does confer a right of access it is not an absolute one as 
access may be suspended or denied in terms of Article 8 and Article 16, 
respectively. It is therefore the general view that the Ports Convention was not 
intended to grant an absolute right of access but to grant access in a reciprocal 
manner which could be limited.159 Morrison states that the fact that there has 
been limited acceptance of the Ports Convention there is insufficient evidence 
that the Ports Convention represents customary international law.160 Brugmann 
states that whilst the Ports Convention is not widely ratified, the States which 
have ratified the Ports Convention represent 53% of the world’s tonnage in 
terms of ownership.161 It is therefore submitted that whilst the Ports Convention 
does not confer absolute rights of entry, there seems to be some agreement 
amongst the signatory states that a right of entry should be granted subject to 
the principle of reciprocity.  
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From the discussion above it is submitted that there is no evidence in 
international customary or conventional law of a general right of access by a 
foreign ship into the internal waters or port of a coastal state. It is therefore 
submitted that ships in need of assistance would likewise find no favour in 
accessing internal waters as a general right for the purposes of refuge outside of 
a specific treaty to this effect.  
4.2.2 Exceptional Right of Access in times of Distress 
From a humanitarian view it is generally recognised that ships have right of entry 
into the sovereign waters of a coastal state in times of distress.162 It could be 
argued that by the beginning of the 20th Century the basic elements of access to 
places of refuge for ships in distress were established to the extent that there 
was a customary international law right to access a place of refuge in time of 
distress.163 
As was discussed in Chapter 2 there has been a fundamental shift in the 
traditional rights afforded to ships in distress. The traditional right of refuge was 
not linked or concerned with the dangers to the marine environment but only that 
of saving the lives of persons on board. The question is therefore whether in the 
absence of any risk to human life, a foreign ship would be able to claim distress 
as a means of being granted a place of refuge within the internal waters of a 
coastal state. 
It is therefore submitted that whilst there still exists a general right of refuge in 
time of distress under international customary law, such right is only applicable 
in circumstances where the granting of access is necessary for saving the lives 
in board. There is therefore no obligation under international customary law on 
the coastal state to grant a place of refuge where the risk is only environmental.  
In a similar fashion as the discussion on general rights of  access, a coastal 
state is  at liberty to  enter into bilateral or multilateral conventions wherein it 
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would agree to grant access in times of ‘environmental distress’. That being said 
there is no evidence of any guaranteed right of access contained in any 
multilateral treaty.164 The Ports Convention does provide ways for a contracting 
party to refuse access in its entirety and did not specifically contain provisions 
relating to ships in distress.165 The Ports Convention did however make mention 
of applying to ‘ports of refuge specifically constructed for that purpose’.166 It is 
therefore possible that a ships flagged to a signatory to the Ports Convention 
would be entitled to access a port in times of distress where that specific port 
had been constructed for that purpose. 
Outside of a specific agreement to the contrary it is submitted that a coastal 
state is not obliged to offer a place of refuge within its internal waters to a ship in 
distress under international law unless the granting of that place of refuge is 
necessary for the saving of human life.  
4.2.2 Concluding Remarks on Rights within Internal Waters 
 
From the above discussion it is submitted that ships in need of assistance do not 
enjoy a general or exceptional right to access the internal waters of a coastal 
state to seek refuge in the absence of same being necessary to save human life.  
It is submitted that coastal states are therefore not obliged to grant a place of 
refuge to a ship in need of assistance within its internal waters or port a general 
right.  It is, however, submitted that pursuant to the duty to protect the marine 
environment discussed below, a coastal state may well be obliged to grant a 
place of refuge to a ship in distress in order to protect and preserve the marine 
environment.  
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4.3 Refuge in Territorial Waters 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the laws regarding the territorial waters and the 
rights and obligations of the coastal state therein are fundamentally different to 
the regime regarding internal waters. Essentially the modern international law 
compromises between sovereignty and freedom of navigation have, through 
negotiation and agreement, have been established by UNCLOS. The coastal 
states continue to enjoy wide legislative and enforcement powers within their 
territorial waters, however, subject to the established rights of other states. 
4.3.1 Innocent Passage 
 
A fundamental difference between the regime regarding territorial waters as 
opposed to internal waters is the concept of innocent passage. Whilst there is 
not right of innocent passage through the internal waters of a coastal state there 
is such a right within the territorial waters.167 Accordingly, rights of access to the 
territorial waters have already been established and agreed subject to certain 
conditions. The concept of innocent passage is a key compromise between the 
concept of freedom of navigation and that of sovereignty and informs the rights 
and duties of coastal states.168 The question is whether the current international 
law regarding innocent passage could be used as a basis for establishing a right 
of refuge for ships in need of assistance. In pursuit of the answer it must be 
established whether a ship in need of assistance complies with the requirements 
of innocent passage as set out in Articles 18 and 19 of UNCLOS in that the ship 
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As was discussed in Chapter 3, the main requirement regarding the definition of  
‘passage’ within Article 18 of  UNCLOS is  that the journey of the ship should be 
‘continuous and  expeditious’. At this point it would seems that a ships in need of 
assistance would not initially satisfy this requirement as in all probability the ship 
would anchor within the territorial waters so as to allow anti-pollution measures  
to be implemented. However, Article 18 does allow for one exception to the 
‘continuous and expeditious’ rule. Such an exception is where stopping and 
anchoring are incidental to navigation or rendered necessary by force majeure 
or distress. It is clear that stopping to deal with pollution is not incidental to 
navigation but it could  be argued that it might fall into a circumstance covered 
by force  majeure  or  distress. As UNCLOS does not specifically define 
‘distress’ it is submitted that ships in need of assistance could fall into ‘distress’ 
as mentioned in Article 18(2) of UNCLOS.169 
A ship’s right to entry as a result of force majeure is settled in international law 
and is an ancient principle.170 The term of force majeure is generally utilised to 
indicate a particular peril which is irresistible and involuntary or an ‘Act of 
God’.171 If there is an instance of genuine force majeure the ship affected 
thereby would be able to rely on Article 18 of UNCLOS and anchor within the 
territorial waters of a coastal state. In such a case all of the rules discussed 
regarding innocent passage would apply to that ship.172 In such a case the 
coastal state would not be permitted to expel the ship in need of assistance from 
its territorial waters provided that the ship remains to be innocent and not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state.  
Where the force majeure is caused by some deficiency, neglect or conduct of 
the ship in question it may introduce an argument that the coastal state would 
                                                          
169
 Article 18(2) of UNCLOS. 
170
 Murrray C “Any Port in a Strom? The Right of Entry for  Reasons of  Force Majeure or  Distress  in the 
Wake of  the Erika and the Castor” 2002 Ohio State Law Journal 1478. 
171
 Morrison Place of Refuge for Ships in Distress- Problems and Methods of 12. 
172
 Murrray 2002 Ohio State Law Journal 1478. 
51 
 
have a right to self-defence as that ship is at least partly responsible for the 
condition in which it finds itself.173 An example of such an instance would be 
where the flag state or owner failed to ensure that the CDEM requirements of 
the ship were maintained and as a result thereof the ship found its self in peril. It 
could be argued that the peril was created, in this example, due to negligence 
and not as a result of an ‘irresistible act’. As a result thereof, the ship in need of 
assistance may not be entitled to the benefits afforded to it under force majeure 
and accordingly may not be entitled to access the territorial sea to seek refuge.  
It is submitted that whilst ship in need of assistance may not meet the 
requirements of force majeure it may nevertheless be in a state of distress and 
therefore granted certain rights.  The notions of distress and force majeure may 
overlap to a degree but force majeure essentially refers to external forces 
affecting the ship. Article 18 of UNCLOS does not differentiate between any 
types of distress and is therefore open for interpretation. It is said  that ‘distress’ 
means an event of grave necessity such as severe weather or mechanical 
failure or a human caused event such as a collision with another ship.174 The 
necessity must be urgent and produce a well-grounded apprehension that there 
will be a loss of the vessel, its cargo or the lives of its crew or passengers.175 
Whilst there is no express indication in UNCLOS that ‘environmental distress’ 
would be sufficient, loss of the vessel or cargo resulting in pollution, could 
constitute distress.  
From the above it would seem therefore that the concepts of force majeure and 
distress may not apply to ships in need of assistance where the ship has failed 
to maintain international CDEM requirements. Accordingly, ships in need of 
assistance in this case will not satisfy the requirements set out in UNCLOS in 
respect of ‘passage’. That being said, where there is no evidence of negligence 
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or poor ship maintenance, it is submitted that ship in need of assistance may fall 
into the category of force majeure or distress set out in Article 18 of  UNCLOS. 
4.3.1.2 Innocence 
 
Assuming that the ship in distress meets the requirements of Article 18 of 
UNCLOS the enquiry would therefore follow as to whether such passage is 
innocent as set out in Article 19. The requirement of innocence is split into two 
parts. Firstly in Article 19(1) it is negatively defined as passage that "is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State” being the 
overarching requirement. Secondly and in attempt to give some context to the 
first part, UNCLOS also provides a list of activities in Article 19(2) which are 
considered to be non-innocent in nature.176 Non-innocent activities relevant to 
this dissertation are “any act of wilful and serious pollution” and “any other 
activity not having a direct bearing on passage” included in subparagraphs (h) 
and (l) of Article 19(2) respectively.  
There is some debate as to the relationship between Article 19(1) and Article 
19(2) of UNCLOS. Some commentators are of the view that the examples listed 
in Article 19(2) are intended to provide coastal states with an objective means 
for interpreting Article 19(1) and therefore limiting the opportunity for abusing 
their rights in this regard.177 In this way the examples listed in Article 19(2) limit 
the enquiry into whether a foreign ship’s activities are seen as non-innocent. 
Should the activity of the foreign ship not fall into one of the examples listed, the 
activity is innocent. On the other hand there are some commentators which are 
of the view notwithstanding the fact that the facts of a particular circumstance 
may not neatly fit into the categories listed in Article 19(2), the ship’s conduct 
can still be classified as ‘prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of a 
coastal state’ in terms of Article 19(1).178 Article 19(2) specifically guides the 
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enquiry and analysis of whether the activity is non-innocent. Article 19(2) 
specifically states that “[p]assage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be 
prejudicial to the prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of a coastal 
state if…it engages in any of the following activities”. Article 19(2) specifically 
stipulates the mechanism for determining whether the activity of the foreign ship 
falls foul of Article 19(1). In this way the enquiry is simply whether the activity of 
the foreign ship falls into one of the examples listed. It is therefore submitted that 
should the activity not be covered by the examples listed in Article 19(2) the 
activity of the foreign ship will be innocent.  
There are also varying opinions as to whether the list in Article 19(2) is 
exhaustive.179 There is no indication contained in the first part of Article 19(2) 
that the list which follows in sub-paragraphs (a) to (l) is an open list. In support 
thereof there is no use of wording such as ‘including but not limited to’ or any 
wording to include a ‘catch-all’ such as, for example, ‘any other activity which is 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of a coastal state’.  It is noted 
that there is a reference in sub-paragraph (l) to a catch-all but same refers to 
‘any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage’ which is discussed 
below.  It is submitted that sub-paragraph (l) does not clearly change the 
character of the list contained in Article 19(2). It is therefore submitted in this 
dissertation that the list of non-innocent activities is seen to be an exhaustive list 
which limits the interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 19.180 Should a 
particular ship’s activities meet the above requirements, the passage of that ship 
will be innocent and the ship would therefore have a legal right to continue its 
passage through the particular territorial waters.  
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In analysis of subparagraphs (h) and (l) of Article 19(2) of UNCLOS it is 
submitted that in general, ships in need of assistance do not fall foul of any 
activities considered to be non-innocent. In respect of subparagraph (h) there 
needs to be wilful pollution which implies a notion of intent. Under normal 
circumstances ships find themselves in distress accidentally or possibly through 
negligence, but not intentionally. In respect of subparagraph (l) the activity must 
not have any direct bearing on passage. As was discussed above and in respect 
of Article 18 of UNCLOS it is very possible that a ship in distress which seeks 
refuge in the territorial waters of a coastal state may well satisfy the 
requirements of passage. The reference to passage in subparagraph (l) of 
Article 19(2) is therefore somewhat circular. It is therefore submitted that a ship 
in distress which seeks refuge would not easily fall foul of Article 19(2). 
Accordingly it is submitted that unless the conduct of the ship in distress falls 
fouls of Article 19(1) of UNCLOS there may well be an obligation on the coastal 
state to regard the passage of a ship in need of assistance as innocent.  
As regards Article 19(1) Sage is  of  the view that the mere threat that a ships in 
need of assistance may cause marine pollution cannot in itself be considered as 
an element of rendering the passage of that ship non-innocent.181 Sage states 
further that an actual environmental damage must have occurred for a coastal 
state to declare that the passage is non-innocent.182 This therefore introduces 
the possibility that ships in need of assistance and vulnerable to causing a 
pollution incident may well be considered innocent in terms of Article 19 of 
UNCLOS. Sage states that a strict interpretation of Article 19 “would exclude the 
possibility of denying the so-called "leper ships" a right of innocent passage on 
grounds of their poor condition, if they were not engaged in a non-innocent 
‘activity”’.183 Sage does note, however, that The International Law Association 
Committee on Coastal state Jurisdiction has accepted that where a ships 
condition is “so deplorable that it is extremely likely to cause a serious incident 
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with major harmful consequences, including to the marine environment" that 
ship’s passage cannot be regarded as innocent.184  
Should the passage of the particular ship meet the requirements of innocence, 
the coastal state is allowed to further regulate the manner in which such 
innocent passage is exercised. The coastal state may adopt laws in respect of 
safety of navigation, regulation of maritime traffic, conservation of the living 
resources of the sea, the preservation of the environment of the coastal state 
and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution.185 It is submitted that 
Article 21 of UNCLOS may provide a basis to regulate the innocent passage of 
ships in need of assistance insofar as the location of the place of refuge is 
concerned. It is submitted that Article 21 does not provide a basis for the coastal 
state to refuse a place of refuge all together as same might fall foul of the rights 
of innocent passage as the laws and regulations adopted in terms of Article 21 
of UNCLOS cannot however have the practical effect of denying or impairing 
innocent passage.186   
4.3.1.3 Concluding Remarks on Innocent Passage 
 
From the above discussion it is submitted that the rules regarding innocent 
passage can cater for ships in need of assistance where there is a risk of 
environmental harm from pollution. It is recognised that not all ships in need of 
assistance could rely on ‘distress’ or force majeure, especially in instances 
where there has been negligence and non-adherence to international 
operational standards. In this regard it is submitted that if one takes a pragmatic 
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approach, recognising that the rights afforded to ships in need of assistance 
should be focussed on solving the immediate problem for the benefit of the ship 
and also in pursuit of protecting the marine environment, questions of culpability 
should be restricted to an ex post facto analysis of which party is to bear the 
costs incurred. It is accordingly submitted that the rules of innocent passage 
could constitute a basis to establish a legal obligation on coastal states to grant 
places of refuge to ships in need of assistance within the territorial sea where 
there is no clear evidence of negligence on behalf of the ship. 
The concept of innocent passage may well provide a legal basis for arguing that 
there is a duty on coastal states to grant places of refuge to ships in need of 
assistance. This would act as a limitation of the traditional sovereignty rights of 
the coastal state. That being said, coastal states may be able to protect 
themselves against the environmental risk of ships in need of assistance though 
other international conventions. These rights of self-protection may allow the  
coastal state to expel ships in need of assistance notwithstanding the right of 
innocent passage.  
4.3.2 The Duty to Co-operate & The Right of Self Protection  
 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, coastal states by virtue of certain multilateral 
treaties owe duties to cooperate with the international community in the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment. Examples of this co-
operation are found in the Salvage Convention and the OPRC. As Shaw notes, 
the OPRC links up with the duties of co-operation in Article 11 of the Salvage 
Convention which confirms the duties on the coastal states to take into account 
the need for co-operation between salvors, other interested parties and public 
authorities.187 Whilst such duties of co-operation do not stipulate a specific legal 
obligation on coastal states to grant places of refuge, such duties to require the 
coastal state to consider the fact that granting a place of refuge might well be 
the most appropriate measure to take in the circumstances.  
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The counterpoint to the above would be the expressions of self-defence found in 
UNCLOS and the Intervention Convention.188 It is however important to bear in 
mind that the measures taken by the coastal state under the Intervention 
Convention must first be subject of consultation with other states and thereafter 
be proportionate to the actual or threatened damage and not go beyond what is 
reasonably necessary to achieve the prevention, mitigation or elimination of 
grave and imminent danger to from pollution.189 
It is submitted that the fundamental principle evident in the above multilateral 
conventions is that of consultation and a balancing of interests based on sound 
information. It is accordingly submitted that the above multilateral conventions 
do not specifically call for the admission of a ships in need of assistance into a 
place of refuge. Similarly it is submitted that same do not indicate a basis from 
which a refusal can be solely based.  It is submitted that the decision to grant or 
refuse a place of refuge under the above conventions would of necessity be a 
value judgement which would need to be informed by the rights of innocent 
passage and the duty to protect the environment.  
4.3.3 Concluding Remarks on Refuge in Territorial Waters 
 
It has been submitted that the rules of innocent passage could well provide a 
standalone legal basis to argue that a coastal state is obliged to grant a place of 
refuge within its territorial waters to  ships  in need  of assistance. This is 
differentiable from the position within the internal waters of a coastal state in so 
far as the obligation to grant a place of refuge within the internal waters may be 
a product of the duty to protect the marine environment and not as a standalone 
obligation.  
A coastal state’s obligations to consult and co-operate in respect of taking 
measures to protect and preserve the marine environment may similarly require 
a coastal state to grant a place of refuge within the territorial sea.   
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4.4 Duty to Protect the Marine Environment 
 
As was set out in detail in Chapter 3 there is a clear general obligation on 
coastal states to protect and preserve the marine environment.190  This duty to 
protect the marine environment could be a legal basis to limit coastal state 
sovereignty in favour of an obligation to grant places of refuge to ships in need 
of assistance.191  Welgemoed is of the view that the discussion on places of 
refuge will turn on the relationship between sovereignty and the duty to protect 
the marine environment.192  
The fundamental characteristic of the duty to protect the marine environment is 
as an overarching, general obligation not limited to a particular maritime zone 
and a duty owed to the international community as whole.  It would be difficult to 
argue that Article 194 (1) of UNCLOS is unclear in this regard.  It places a clear 
positive duty on all states to take all appropriate measures that are necessary to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any 
source.  
As was discussed above modern coastal state practice seems to indicate that 
coastal states are entitled to exercise sovereign powers and refuse entry to a 
place of refuge to a ship in need of assistance. The difficulty is trying to reconcile 
these sovereign powers with the general obligation to protect the marine 
environment. By refusing access to a place of refuge, the coastal state itself 
could be the contributing factor in a resulting pollution incident.    
Tanaka states that coastal states have a dual role with regards to pollution. 
Coastal states are to protect their own interests but as a member of the 
international community, coastal states are to protect the marine environment in 
favour of the interests of the whole international community.193 Tanaka  is further 
of  the view that coastal states are required to show due  diligence and not 
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cause  transfrontier pollution.194 This is supported by Article 194 (2) of UNCLOS 
which obliges coastal states to ensure that pollution does not spread beyond 
their sovereign areas. There may be cause  to argue that if it can be shown that 
a coastal state did not act with due diligence to all the relevant factors and 
decides to refuse  entry to a  ship in need of assistance and a pollution incident 
occurred, the coastal state may be liable to affected persons for the damages 
suffered.195  
The duty to protect the marine environment does not necessarily speak to the 
rights of access to a particular maritime zone of a particular coastal state. The 
crux of the duty is to preserve and protect the marine environment. It is therefore 
submitted that where a place of refuge is requested by a ship in need of 
assistance so as to protect the marine environment from pollution, the coastal 
state is obliged to take the appropriate measures in order to ensure that the 
marine environment is protected from harm. It is irrelevant as to whether a place 
of refuge is granted and where such would be located. What is relevant is that 
the chosen location allows for the appropriate antipollution measures to be put in 
place so as to ensure that the marine environment is preserved and protected.    
4.5 The IMO Guidelines  
 
It has been stated that that there is no clear legal regime governing and guiding 
the decisions by coastal states to grant places of refuge to ships in need of 
assistance.196 In response to the difficulties encountered and lack of uniform 
decision making criteria the IMO adopted its Guidelines on Places of Refuge for 
Ships in need of Assistance in December 2003 (the IMO Guidelines).197 The 
IMO Guidelines are aimed at balancing the rights of the ship with that of the 
coastal state so as to provide a common framework which can be used to 
determine places of refuge and respond effectively to requests by ships in need 
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of assistance.198  The IMO Guidelines essentially provide for risk assessment 
and decision making criteria so as to promote objective decision making as to 
requests for places of refuge.199 The IMO Guidelines align directly with the issue 
dealt with in this dissertation. The question is whether these IMO Guidelines 
provide a legal basis from which one could argue that a coastal state is obliged 
to provide a place of refuge to a ship in need of assistance.  
Paragraph 1.7 of the IMO Guidelines acknowledges that “granting access to a 
place of refuge could involve a political decision which can only be taken on a 
case-by-case basis with due consideration given to the balance between the 
advantage for the affected ship and the environment resulting from bringing the 
ship into a place of refuge and the risk to the environment resulting from that 
ship being near the coast”.200 The IMO Guidelines therefore clearly acknowledge 
that there is no obligation on the coastal state to grant a place of refuge.201 The 
IMO Guidelines provide, at the very most, a basis to assess the situation in line 
with the provisions contained therein.202 The IMO Guidelines although being 
non-binding might well encourage a coastal state to properly consider a request 
for a place of refuge with proper consultation of interested parties and the 
reliance on sound information.203 This might link up to the duties of consultation 
and co-operation discussed earlier on in this Chapter. Morrison states that there 
has been some acceptance of the IMO Guidelines in the United Kingdom, 
European Union, Canada and Australia and there is therefore a chance that the 
IMO Guidelines or something similar might end up as a new norm of customary 
international law in the future.204  
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 
This dissertation sought to discuss and analyse the current state of international 
law concerning ships in need of assistance in order to determine whether 
coastal states are obliged to grant places of refuge in times of distress as a 
means to protect the marine environment. The proposition put forward in this 
dissertation was that the granting of places of refuge to ships in need of 
assistance would in all likelihood reduce the probability of a pollution incident 
occurring. It further proposed that should a pollution incident nevertheless occur, 
had the ship been granted a place of refuge, the extent of the pollution may well 
be minimised. Essentially places of refuge offer a sheltered area to ships in 
need of assistance to enable the effective implantation of antipollution 
measures. The focus of the discussion within this dissertation was the 
recognition that places of refuge play an important role in the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment. 
The concept of ships in need of assistance is a relatively modern development 
of the traditional custom concerning ships in distress. Traditionally a distressed 
ship had a right of entry into a ‘port of refuge’ (as they were referred to then). 
There has been a notable paradigm shift in the development of the concept of 
distress. The custom concerning distress was traditionally primarily concerned 
with the protection of human life. With the advances of modern technology the 
requirement for granting a distressed ship refuge in port in order to save the 
persons on board was reduced. Persons on board can now, in many instances, 
be saved whist the distressed ship is out at sea. The advance of technology also 
brought larger vessels which are able to transport significant quantities of 
potentially polluting materials. The potential pollution risk concerning these ships 
is therefore much higher in the modern era when compared with the ships of the 
past. These two broad developments sparked the change in coastal state 
position on the obligations to provide places of refuge to ships in distress. This 
difference is reflected in the terminology used when describing the specific 
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instance of distress. Where there is a risk to human life such a ship is termed a 
‘ship in distress’. Where there is only a risk to the vessel, cargo and marine 
environment such ships are termed ‘ships in need of assistance’. 
It is common place for coastal states, when faced with a request for a place of 
refuge, to differentiate between ships in distress and ships in need of 
assistance. Coastal states have demonstrated a reluctance to grant a place of 
refuge to a ship in need of assistance as there is no risk to human life. This 
reluctance and development of the traditional rights of ships in distress has 
introduced the problem of ships in need of assistance. To what end, if any, has 
the traditional right of refuge been preserved in the modern era? Chapter 2 
concluded that whilst the traditional right of refuge remains valid such rights only 
apply to circumstances where there is human life at risk. Accordingly the 
traditional rights of refuge do not apply to the modern ships in need of 
assistance.  
In order to establish an obligation on coastal states to grant places of refuge to 
ships in need of assistance alternative bases of international law must be 
explored. The analysis of UNCLOS together with other multilateral conventions 
in Chapter 3 provided a good basis to explore the rights and duties of coastal 
states with respect to access and measures aimed at regulating pollution.  
The establishment of an obligation on coastal states to grant places of refuge to 
ships in distress would legitimise a limitation on coastal state sovereignty. It was 
concluded that coastal states have a wide legislative and enforcement 
competency to regulate access into their sovereign waters and to adopt laws 
regarding pollution control. The differentiation was made between the regime 
regulating internal waters and that of territorial waters. This differentiation 
illustrated the fact that whilst coastal states are required to grant limited access 
to foreign ships in territorial waters, such access does not apply in internal 
waters. With regards to internal waters it was concluded that subject only to the 
duty to protect the marine environment there would be no obligation to grant a 
place of refuge to ships in need of assistance.  
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The discussion on territorial waters introduced the concept on innocent passage 
which represents an agreed limitation of coastal state sovereignty provided that 
certain conditions are met. In Chapter 4 this concept was discussed in detail and 
whilst there may be some argument to the contrary, innocent passage could 
provide a standalone legal basis to argue that a coastal state is obliged to grant 
a place of refuge within its territorial waters in the absence of negligence on the 
part of the ship in need of assistance. Whilst it may be possible to determine the 
cause of the situation with the benefit and clarity of time and hindsight, it is 
submitted that in the moment of a maritime incident a strict reliance and 
investigation of causation would defeat the purpose of Article 18 of UNCLOS. it  
is submitted that where force majeure or distress  is claimed, the  coastal states 
should act on the presumption that  the ship meets the requirements thereof 
without undue reliance on arguments of causation and  proceed  with haste to 
mitigate  the potential negative  effects of  the maritime incident. It is submitted 
that undue reliance on self-protection in this regard would not be consistent with 
the coastal state’s duties to act with due diligence and protect and preserve the 
marine environment.  
It is submitted that the duty to protect the marine environment is an overarching 
duty owed to the international community as a whole. Coastal states have a duty 
to protect the marine environment and take measures to ensure that no 
transfrontier pollution occurs.  It is submitted that the duty to protect the marine 
environment does not necessarily speak to the rights of access to a particular 
maritime zone of a particular coastal state. It is submitted therefore that the duty 
to protect the marine environment does not provide a legal basis to argue that 
coastal states are obliged to grant access into internal or territorial waters. 
However, the duty to protect the marine environment is not being served by a 
complete refusal to grant places of refuge to ships in need of assistance.205  It is 
submitted that whilst the coastal state has a duty to protect the marine 
environment and take measures to ensure that no transfrontier pollution occurs, 
this duty does not specifically require the coastal state to grant access within its  
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sovereign waters. For instance the coastal state could establish dedicated 
reception facilities outside of its sovereign waters to deal with ships in need of 
assistance. In a similar fashion as the concept of ‘port of refuge’ developed into 
that of a ‘place of refuge’ not necessarily being within a port, it is possible for 
‘places of refuge’ to develop and be established outside of the internal or 
territorial waters of a coastal state.  
It is however recognised that main reason places of refuge have been requested 
within the internal or territorial waters of a coastal state is that such locations 
provide suitable conditions for the execution of antipollution measures. It may 
simply not be possible to engage in antipollution measures in the high seas. This 
is however only the current position. In a similar fashion as the advances in 
shipping technology have developed so too could the antipollution measures 
and reception facilities be developed. If requisite technology is developed, 
coastal states may well be able to comply with their environmental duty without 
granting access into their internal or territorial waters.  
The thrust of the duty is to preserve and protect the marine environment. Where 
granting a place of refuge to a ship in need of assistance is the only appropriate 
measure available there may be an obligation on the coastal state to grant such 
place of refuge purely as a means of protecting the marine environment. If, 
through advancement of technology or the establishment of off shore pollution 
reception facilities, coastal states can adequately deal with ships in need of 
assistance there would be no reason or need to grant a place of refuge within 
the sovereign waters of the coastal state. 
This dissertation sought to analyse whether there was a legal obligation on 
coastal states to grant places of refuge to ships in need of assistance. 
Essentially this dissertation analysed whether there was a limitation on coastal 
state sovereignty when dealing with ships in need of assistance. Discussions in 
this regard are usually focussed around access to sovereign waters and the 
obligation, if any, to grant such access in times of need. It is submitted that there 
is no clear legal basis which legitimately limits the sovereign powers rights of 
65 
 
coastal states outside of the arguments of innocent passage and specifically 
agreed conventional law. If one constrains the discussion to issues of 
sovereignty and limitations thereof, it is submitted that problem of ships in need 
of assistance is difficult to solve. However, if one focusses on the key issue 
regarding ships in need of assistance, being the potential negative impact to the 
marine environment, issues of access and sovereignty become less relevant. 
The duty to protect the marine environment is already accepted as a legitimate 
limitation on sovereignty as was discussed in this dissertation. It is therefore 
submitted that there is no need to establish a separate legal basis to limit the 
sovereignty of coastal states in respect of protection of the marine environment 
as same already exists. Furthermore, the duty to protect the marine environment 
does not specifically speak to issues of sovereignty and access. The duty is 
focussed on the protection of the marine environment. The enquiry is therefore 
whether the act of refusing to grant a place of refuge to a ship in need of 
assistance falls within the established duty to protect the marine environment.  
To answer this question there would be a need to consider the specific 
circumstances in each and every case in order to determine the appropriate 
course of action so as to ensure that the interests of the marine environment are 
prioritised. It is therefore submitted that where the circumstances require a ship 
in need of assistance to be granted a place of refuge in order to protect the 
marine environment, coastal states are obliged to grant such refuge in their 
internal or territorial waters as the case may be. It is submitted that this 
obligation is clear and unequivocal in modern international law of the sea. Any 
act of refusal by a coastal state cannot be reconciled the overarching duty to 
protect the marine environment.  
The difficulty lies in making the decision of what is the most appropriate course 
of action so as to ensure that the marine environment is protected and therefore 
give effect to the duty. It is submitted that this is where further development is 
required. The decision making criteria to be utilised in the context of ships in 
need of assistance needs to be universally agreed and flexible in nature in order 
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to be adaptable to different circumstances whilst always placing the protection of 
the marine environment at the forefront. It is submitted that the goal is to draft 
and agree a multilateral convention dealing with ships in need of assistance, 
specifically setting out the decision making criteria to be utilised.  It is submitted 
that there is no need for further discussion and debate as to whether coastal 
states are obliged to grant places of refuge to ships in need of assistance. It is 
submitted that this obligation has already been established as and when the 
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